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The Federalist Society for Law  
and Public Policy 
presents 
AGENCY PREEMPTION: SPEAK SOFTLY, BUT 
CARRY A BIG STICK? 
2006  National  Lawyer’s  Convention 
November 18, 2006 
PANELISTS: 
Hon. Ronald A. Cass, President, Cass & Associates, PC and Dean 
Emeritus, Boston University School of Law 
Professor Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia University School of Law 
Professor Catherine M. Sharkey, New York University School of Law 
Hon. Daniel E. Troy, Sidley Austin and Former Chief Counsel, United 
States Food & Drug Administration 
Hon. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, United States Circuit Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (moderator) 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN:   It is a great pleasure for me to welcome 
you   to   our   panel   today,   entitled   “Agency   Preemption:   Speak   Softly,   but 
Carry   a  Big  Stick?”     As  moderator,  my   task   is   twofold.      First,   I   hope   to  
frame the panel discussion by reference to preemption law generally, as 
well as recent events and developments in agency preemption. 
Secondly, I hope to convince you of the enormous importance of this 
otherwise arcane topic, because, while it may sound esoteric, it goes to the 
heart of the constitutional order, in my view.  As one scholar explained, the 
extent to which a federal statute displaces state law affects both the subs-
tantive legal rules under which we live and the distribution of authority be-
tween the states and the federal government. 
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Speaking generally, there are three types of preemption: express 
preemption, applied field preemption, and implied conflict preemption.  
This panel will focus on implied conflict preemption, which courts find ei-
ther where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and 
federal requirements or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the federal purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.  Given that we have a former official of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration  on  a  panel  today,  I   thought  I  would  set   the  stage  for  today’s  panel  
debate by discussing a recent state court case dealing with agency preemp-
tion. 
The case is Levine v. Wyeth,1 by decision of the Vermont Supreme 
Court.  The facts of the case are simple, yet sympathetic.  Levine brought a 
tort action alleging negligence and failure to warn against the drug compa-
ny, and was awarded $6.8 million in damages by a jury.  Her claim was 
that the warning accompanying the drug was insufficient to alert her and 
her doctors to the dangers of intravenous injection.  The primary question 
on  appeal  was  whether  Levine’s  failure  to  warn  claims  were  preempted  by 
the  FDA’s  approval  of  the  particular  label  that  accompanied  the  drug. 
The  Vermont  Supreme  Court  essentially  held  that  the  FDA’s  approval  
of the drug label constituted a warning floor and not a ceiling.  In other 
words, the court thought Wyeth could have, and should have, done more to 
warn Levine of the dangers associated with intravenous injection of Phe-
nergan.  In dissent, the Vermont Chief Justice argued that, by approving 
Phenergan for marketing and distribution, the FDA concluded that the 
drug, with its approved methods of administration, and label, was both safe 
and   effective.      He   continued,   “In   finding   defendant   liable   for   failure   to  
warn, a Vermont jury concluded that the same drug, with its FDA-approved 
methods of administration and as labeled, was unreasonably dangerous.  
These  two  conclusions  are  in  direct  conflict.”2  In  the  Chief  Justice’s  view,  
the  FDA’s  approval  of  the  warning  label  constituted  both  a  floor  and  a  ceil-
ing,  and  Levine’s  claims  were  preempted. 
Such competing views raise important legal questions.  In Levine, the 
drug  company’s  position  was  bolstered  by  a  statement  of  the  FDA  that  cas-
es rejecting preemption of failure to warn claims pose an obstacle to the 
Agency’s  enforcement  of  the  labeling  requirements.    So,  what  sort  of  defe-
rence,  if  any,  is  due  to  an  agency’s  statement  about  the  preemptive  scope  of  
its regulations?  Most broadly, in promulgating preemptive regulations and 
adopting statements regarding preemption, can and do agencies adequately 
protect the values of federalism?  How should the traditional presumption 
against preemption operate in this realm?  Finally, what is the best way to 
protect citizens like Ms. Levine? 
 
 1 No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006). 
 2 Id. at ¶ 45 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has the opportunity to enlighten us on the 
proper resolution of some of these difficult questions when it considers the 
case Watters v. Wachovia Bank3 later this month.  At issue in that case is a 
regulation promulgated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
which states that unless otherwise provided by federal law or OCC regula-
tion, state laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same 
extent that they apply to the parent national bank.  The Sixth Circuit, fol-
lowing both the Second Circuit and my court, the Ninth Circuit, applying 
Chevron deference,4 took the view   that   the   Commissioner’s   regulations  
preempted Michigan banking laws in their entirety, as applied to the oper-
ating subsidiaries.5  Perhaps one of the panelists will comment on why it is 
that the Supreme Court took Watters, given the fact that the three promi-
nent cases all came out the same way. 
In any event, to help us think about the many important issues and 
lead-up to Watters and beyond, the Federalist Society has gathered a dis-
tinguished group of scholars who will speak with us today.  We will be 
hearing first from Daniel Troy, who is a partner in the Washington office of 
Sidley Austin, and immediately prior to that served as the Chief Counsel of 
the Food and Drug Administration, after being appointed to the position by 
President George W. Bush.  In that role, Mr. Troy was an active player in 
the  FDA’s  generally  successful  assertion  of  preemption  in  selected  product  
liability cases.  Mr. Troy is a graduate of Columbia Law School and served 
as a clerk for D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork from 1983 to 1984. 
Next,  we’ll  be  hearing  from  Ronald  Cass,  who  currently  serves  as  the  
President of Cass & Associates.  He previously served as the Dean of the 
Boston University School of Law from 1990 to 2004, and was a commis-
sioner, and then later vice-chairman, of the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission under Presidents Reagan and Bush I.  Dean Cass is a graduate of 
the University of Virginia and of the University of Chicago Law Review, 
with honors.  After graduation, he served as law clerk to the Honorable 
Collins Seitz, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit. 
We will then hear from Professor Catherine Sharkey, a newly-minted 
professor of law at Columbia Law School and currently a visiting professor 
at NYU Law School.  Since joining the Columbia faculty, professor Shar-
key has come to be recognized as a leading voice in the legal academy on 
both punitive damages and products liability preemption.  Professor Shar-
key is a graduate of Yale University, as well as Oxford, which she attended 
as a Rhodes Scholar.  She is a graduate of Yale Law School and served as 
 
 3 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S.Ct. 1559, 1573 (2007) (affirming the Sixth  Circuit’s  
holding  that  the  Commissioner’s  regulations  preempted  Michigan  banking  laws). 
 4 See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (estab-
lishing the Chevron standard). 
 5 Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 127 S.Ct. at 1573. 
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law clerk for Judge Guido Calabrese of the Second Circuit and Justice Da-
vid Souter of the Supreme Court. 
Finally, we will hear from Professor Thomas Merrill, the Charles Kel-
ler Beekman Professor of Law, also at Columbia Law School.  Professor 
Merrill recently filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Center for State En-
forcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws in the Watters case 
that will be argued shortly.  He is a graduate of Brunel College and also at-
tended Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.  After graduation from the University 
of Chicago Law School, he served as law clerk to Judge David Bazelon of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and to Justice Harry Black-
man of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
We will hear first from Mr. Troy. 
 
HON. MR. TROY: Thank   you,   Judge   for   the   introduction.   It’s   a  
pleasure to be here. 
Often those of us who are members of this Society and in favor of 
preemption in appropriate circumstances are accused of being hypocrites.  
Everybody   says,   “Well,   it’s   the  Federalist  Society,”   confusing  Federalists  
and federalism.  I want to make clear that there is difference between the 
Federalist Society and being reflexively in favor of federalism.  Madison 
was selected as the icon for our group not because of his much later states 
rights positions but because he was the father of the Constitution.  Some-
times I think we should have selected both Madison and Hamilton, because 
it is, of course, the Federalist Papers after which the Society is named, and 
those Papers are in favor of a strong, albeit limited, central government. 
It is important in the context of this conference, which is about limited 
government, to focus on the importance of preemption to limiting govern-
ment.  What do I mean?  Well, in the case of food and drugs, if you have 
very strong federal regulation, but not preemption, you end up with perhaps 
51 levels of government, 51 different systems that people need to navigate.  
Now, one can imagine a world with no federal regulation of drugs at all, 
with every state regulating.  You might have competitive federalism, in that 
case, and you might not. 
But when you have the system that we have, at least in the realm of 
drugs and medical products, you cannot begin to test a product on humans 
without getting the federal government to approve it in advance.  You can-
not market the product without the federal government approving it in ad-
vance.  You cannot manufacture the product without the government ap-
proving it in  advance.     People  hear  the  words  “new  drug  application”  and  
think,  “Oh,  college  application.”    In  fact,  a  new  drug  application  normally  
has as much data, as many boxes of documents, as would literally fill this 
room.  These applications are delivered to the Agency by the truckload.  
The Agency looks at that data and, for the purposes of this panel, compre-
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hensively determines what may and may not be said about the drug product 
through labeling.  Labeling is not merely a floor, notwithstanding what the 
Vermont Supreme Court said. 
What the FDA said in its most recent preemption preamble is that it is 
a floor and a ceiling.  I want to illustrate that by talking about some specific 
cases, because the devil is in the details and, on the one hand, this stuff can 
be esoteric and arcane, but on the other, if you really look at the public 
health of the matter—and,   I’d   like   to   suggest,   the   common   sense   of   the  
matter—I think the case for preemption becomes very powerful. 
Let me talk about the case called Dowhal,6 the California Supreme 
Court case. As many of you know, California has something called Propo-
sition 65,7 which   requires  warnings   if   there’s   any   substance   in   a   product  
that can either be carcinogenic or can cause harm in a pregnancy.  The is-
sue in the case involved nicotine replacement therapy products.  These are 
products  that  somebody  takes  if  they’re  trying  to  quit  smoking.    The  FDA  
said,  “We  want  the  warning  to  say,  ‘Try  to  stop  smoking  without  this  prod-
uct.  This product can be useful, but talk to your doctor.  Nicotine can have 
adverse  impacts.’” 
There was a lawsuit filed under Prop 65—which, to his credit, the Cal-
ifornia Attorney General did not join.  The gravamen was that they wanted 
the  nicotine  replacement   therapy  product   to  say,  “Nicotine  can  harm  your 
baby.”    That  was  all.    But  the  FDA  rejected  this  warning  in  a  series  of  let-
ters  and  in  more  formal  responses  to  citizens’  petitions.    It  said,  “We  don’t  
want  that  warning.”    That  warning  might  cause  a  woman  to  misunderstand  
that, actually, nicotine replacement products are a good thing. 
Well, the California Court of Appeals said, as the Vermont Supreme 
Court  did,  that  it’s  always  better  to  have  more  warnings,  and  the  FDA  got  
involved.  One thing the federal career officials believe is that when they 
decide a matter, when they have, in the language of Chevron, directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue, they should get to win.  So they thought 
in this case.  Fortunately, we went to the California Supreme Court, and the 
California  Supreme  Court   said,   “Actually, more warnings are not always 
better.” 
Perhaps the most controversial case involved something called SSRIs 
(antidepressants).  It is a tragic fact that people who are depressed tend to 
commit  suicide.    So,  it’s  hard  to  tease  out  whether  there’s  a  connection be-
tween antidepressants and suicide.  At the time these products were first 
approved, the question to the FDA Expert Advisory Committee was: 
Should there be a warning that these products might cause suicide?  They 
said  no  because  they  didn’t  think there was data to support that.  Secondari-
ly, they thought it might dissuade people who were depressed from taking 
 
 6 Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P. 3d 1 (Cal. 2004). 
 7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (2007). 
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the drug. 
There are many people concerned about antidepressants. So, for ex-
ample, the Scientologists and Public Citizen came back to the FDA time 
and again asking the Agency to put this warning on, and the FDA kept say-
ing,   “We’re  sorry,  but  we  don’t   think   that’s   the   right   thing   to  do.      It  will  
over-warn.    It’s  not  just  a  floor;;  more  warnings  are  not  always  better.” 
Well, a lawsuit was brought in the Tenth Circuit,8 the thrust of which 
was that, in this case, Pfizer should have labeled its antidepressant product 
Zoloft  to  say,  “This  product  can  cause  suicide.”    It  was  brought  by  someone  
who survived a relative who had taken the product and six days later com-
mitted suicide, tragically.9  The district court said that more warnings are 
always better, the suit can go forward.  Again, the FDA got involved and 
said,  “Excuse  me,  we  think  that  would  have  misbranded  the  product.” 
So, in talking about conflict preemption, it certainly begs the question, 
if the FDA thinks a product would be misbranded, how can state law re-
quirements compel product labeling that would be technically misbranded 
and illegal under federal law?  If that is not implied conflict preemption, I 
don’t  know  what  is. 
The  FDA  has  continued  to  intervene,  but  it’s  important  to  note  that  the  
Agency itself does not have litigating authority.  The FDA intervenes 
through  the  HHS  General  Counsel’s  Office  and  the  Justice  Department. 
It is the final backstop.  This is, I think, one of the things that has 
caused this controversy and caused this panel.  Instead of intervening with 
individual amicus briefs, the FDA issued this broad statement on preemp-
tion  that  basically  said,  “Our  regulations  are  not  just  a  floor,  they’re  also  a  
ceiling.  More warnings are not always better.  And when we make a deci-
sion we are not looking at the benefits and risks of a product in the context 
of  an  individual.    We’re  making  a  societal  decision.    We  understand  that  all 
drugs have risks.  There are no drugs that are risk-free; people often forget 
this.  And so, we understand when we put the product on the market that 
there will be some adverse events.  That is an unhappy fact that comes from 
having therapeutic products.  But  we’re  making  a  broad  risk-benefit calcu-
lation, and so that calculation must necessarily displace state suits that 
would  have   the   effect  of  undercutting   the  FDA’s  definitive  determination  
about  the  warning  label.” 
And so, to close, this is part of what   is  sometimes  called  the  “stealth  
tort  reform”  by  the  Bush  administration.    But  it  seems  to  me  that  if  you’re  
going to have a very powerful regulatory scheme, that there is naturally 
going to be some state regulation imposed through the product liability sys-
tem that has to be set aside.  Thank you. 
 
 8 Miller v. Pfizer Inc. (Roerig Division), 196 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.Kan. 2002). 
 9 Id. 
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JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN:  Dean Cass. 
 
DEAN CASS: Before I start, I have to say I had a phone conversation 
with my colleagues here, and I misunderstood the topic.  I thought that they 
said talk softly and do shtick.  So  I’m  going  to  begin  with  a  brief  anecdote. 
This is actually a story my wife told me, involving a friend of hers 
who one day saw a funeral procession in the suburbs of Washington.  It 
was  a  very  unusual  procession.    In  New  Orleans,  you’re  used  to  seeing  that 
but not in Washington.  It consisted of a hearse followed by a second 
hearse, followed by a woman dressed in black walking a dog, followed by a 
thousand women in single file. 
My  wife’s   friend  went   up   to   the   woman   walking   the   dog   and   said,  
“You  know,  I  have to ask you.  This is the most unusual funeral procession 
I’ve   seen.     Who’s   in   the   hearse?”      The  woman   said,   “It’s   my   husband.”    
“How  did  he  die?”    The  woman  pointed  and  said,  “My  dog  attacked  him.    
We were having an argument.  The dog took it seriously, went berserk, and 
killed  my  husband.”    Her  friend  apologized  and  said,  “Who’s  in  the  second  
hearse?”    And  the  woman  said,  “It’s  my  mother-in-law.  She tried to inter-
vene  and  the  dog  killed  her  too.”    Susie’s  friend  thought  for  a  minute  and  
said,  “Can  I  borrow  your  dog?”    At  which  point,  the  woman  said,  “Get  in  
line.” 
There are some ideas that seem like good ideas, and appeal to a lot of 
people.    We’re  really  not  dealing  with  one  idea  here,  but  three:  the  idea  of  
limited government, the question of the level of government appropriate to 
make a particular decision, and the question of which organ of government 
should  make  that  decision.    What’s  the  right  competence?    Is  it  the  courts?    
Is it the agencies?  Is it the Legislature? 
For me, the ultimate test is not,  “does  this  get  us  a  particular  amount  
of  government?”    It’s  a  combination  of  quantity  and  quality  of  government.    
If   you   look   to   the   Framing,   the   concern  wasn’t   just   to   limit   government.    
After all, the Constitution expanded the national government in very signif-
icant ways over the Articles of Confederation.  The goal was to preserve 
and protect liberty and security, which is done by having not the minimal 
government, but the right sort of government, delivered in the right way. 
The Constitution gives the national government control over interstate 
commerce.  It also has a provision decreeing that the national government 
should not tax or lay particular impediments to the trade coming out of any 
one   state.      It   says   to   the   states   that   they   shouldn’t   lay   taxes on the trade 
coming  out  of  their  states  unless  they’re  so  directed  by  Congress;;  and  the  
tax goes to the Treasury.  What the Framers were quite clearly trying to do 
was to facilitate the free flow of goods among states.  They were cognizant 
of the fact   that  if  you  don’t  give  the  national  government  the  control  over  
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the flow of goods within states, you will have a lot of impediments to trade, 
because states have an incentive to internalize benefits and externalize 
costs. 
We see this all the time when you look at how state attorneys general 
deal with companies doing business in their state.  They try to impose spe-
cial burdens on the business that can bring benefits into their state; they try 
to localize regulation of what is a national or international enterprise; and 
they frequently do this using very ham-handed means, because if they were 
more transparent about what they were doing, it would be more difficult to 
get where they want to go. 
The distinction Dan Troy drew between those who are Federalists, be-
lieving in a system with different levels of government, and those who be-
lieve that all decisions should be made by the state or local level, is a very 
important one.  There are certain decisions that should be made at the state 
or local level because they deal with state and local problems.  That is most 
congruent with protecting the liberty and the values of the people in those 
states or localities.  When you deal with something that has national or in-
ternational scope, giving states the right to speak to those issues can be 
counterproductive to liberty, security, and efficiency. 
When we are trying to determine who ought to be making these deci-
sions, we are often dealing with statutes that most of us might not like.  We 
think the area of regulation may not be a good thing.  We think the national 
government is excessively regulating.  But to then say that the way to deal 
with this problem is to allow states to also regulate may impose additional 
duplicative and conflicting burdens on businesses.  Those are the things we 
ought to disfavor and avoid whenever possible. 
A lot of the cases we are dealing with here deal with the question: 
When an agency is regulating, what presumption should attach?  Should 
the presumption be that an agency regulation ousts state regulation?  
Should we be relatively inclined or relatively disinclined to find conflicts?  
Historically, the rule has been that we are relatively disinclined to find con-
flicts. 
The next level of argument is: Who ought to be making that determi-
nation?  Here is where things have gotten more contentious.  The courts 
have said that the agencies at the national level issuing regulations are giv-
en deference in interpreting the law because Congress intended, in creating 
this particular regulatory scheme, to authorize the agency to be the first 
place ambiguities are resolved.  This is a matter of statutory interpretation.  
That interpretation logically extends to the interference or noninterference 
with the schemes of state and local governments. 
Judge   O’Scannlain   asked,   “Why,   when   all   of   the   courts—the Ninth 
Circuit, the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit—came out the same way on 
this, did the Supreme Court take cert?”    I  think  they  were  confused.    They  
saw the six upside down and thought it was a nine.  You know, the Su-
ADMIN_LAW_AGENCY_PREEMPTION_PANEL_363-388 (rev - O'Scannlain) 4/17/2008 6:15 PM 
2008] Speak Softly, But Carry a Big Stick? 371 
preme Court took cases from the Ninth Circuit to reverse your colleagues, 
not you.  I also noticed that at the dinner the other night that there was a 
place  for  Judge  O’Scannlain,  but  they  did  not  put  the  usual  “reserved”  sign.    
They were afraid he would  think  it  said  “reversed”. 
 
PROFESSOR SHARKEY: Good afternoon. I want to talk about 
what  I  call  an  “agency  reference”  model—as  distinct  from  an  “agency  defe-
rence”  model—to   be   used   in   a   court’s   determination   of   implied   preemp-
tion, particularly in the products liability context.10 
First, to set the stage, consider that the FDA and other agencies have 
recently   enacted   “preemption   preambles”—statements included in pream-
bles  to  final  regulatory  rules  indicating  the  agency’s  belief  that  the  federal  
regulatory standard preempts common law tort actions.11  As Dan Troy has 
pointed out, the FDA included a statement of preemptive intent in its recent 
rule governing the format and content of prescription drug labels.  
NHTSA’s   (National   Highway   Traffic   Safety   Administration) preemption 
preamble appears in a recent notice of proposed rulemaking about roof 
safety standards.  The Consumer Products Safety Commission, for the first 
time in its thirty-three-year history, proposed a preemption preamble in a 
2006 regulation addressing flammability standards for mattresses.  (The 
FDA and NHTSA had done so previously.)12  Given the flurry of recent 
federal agency activity here in Washington, D.C., this topic has real curren-
cy. 
The agency reference model is a middle-course approach to guide 
courts in making implied preemption determinations.  Where Congress is 
clear about its intent to preempt or displace state law, its intent would go-
vern.  It turns out, however, that when Congress enacts piecemeal legisla-
tion concerning specific products, such as the Motor Vehicle Safety Act or 
the Federal Boat Safety Act, Congress has been anything but clear.  Typi-
cally, these product statutes include very broad preemption clauses that ex-
pressly preempt any conflicting state requirement.  Congress usually says 
that   state   “requirements”   or   “standards”   are   preempted,   using   broad   lan-
guage that has been read to include common law state tort actions.  These 
broad preemption clauses are coupled with very broad savings clauses that 
purport to leave common law actions intact.  In these instances, Congress 
seems to be saying everything.  In other instances, such as the Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act, it is all but silent.  In the provisions that deal with medi-
cal products, there is a preemption clause, but in the provisions dealing 
with drugs, there is not.  As Congress does not expressly answer the 
 
 10 For an elaboration of this framework, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemp-
tion: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2008). 
 11 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization 
of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
 12 21 C.F.R. § 201 (2006); 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2005). 
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preemption questions that products liability cases implicate, there is ample 
room for other decision-makers—namely, courts and agencies—to step in. 
Congress’s  failure  to weigh in on the issue of preemption of common 
law actions, which cannot realistically be ascribed to inadvertent omission, 
is puzzling.  For example, associated with the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide and Rodenticide Act, at issue in the recent Supreme Court case of 
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC,13 there are over a thousand pages of leg-
islative history and yet not a word about the fate of state common law tort 
actions.  But when this Act was amended in 1972, such actions were quite 
common.  The interesting question is an institutional one: Does Congress 
punt the preemption determination to courts or to agencies?  How should 
this interplay work?  The agency reference model that I advocate would 
leave the decision-making power in courts, but not allow them either to 
give  mandatory  deference  to  the  agency  position  or  to  ignore  the  agency’s  
position. 
Contrast the present situation where courts are taking extreme posi-
tions when faced with the issue of whether the FDCA and regulations 
promulgated thereunder by the FDA preempt common law failure to warn 
claims.     In  his  remarks  today,  Judge  O’Scannlain  mentioned  the  Levine v. 
Wyeth14 case, which exemplifies one extreme pole, where courts say that 
there   is   a   “presumption   against   preemption”   and   that   the   purpose   of   the 
FDCA is to protect health and safety, so how could any state tort action ev-
er be preempted?  The idea that more regulation is always better seems 
clearly wrong in the context of drugs or any product situation where the de-
termination rests upon risk-risk tradeoffs.    If  you  add  warnings,  you’re  not  
just warning consumers of certain risks, you are inevitably creating alterna-
tive risks insofar as individuals, or their physicians, are scared off from 
these drugs.  That is one extreme. 
At the other extreme lie courts  that  defer  unconditionally  to  the  FDA’s  
“misbranding”   argument   in   favor   of   preemption   of   common   law   claims:  
that a manufacturer can never unilaterally strengthen or alter a label warn-
ing, lest it risk being prosecuted by the FDA for misbranding the drug.  The 
upshot   is   that   the   FDA’s   pre-market new drug approval process would 
grant the drug manufacturers immunity from state common law tort actions 
(most often failure to warn claims).  And this safe harbor would protect 
drug manufacturers even in situations where new risks (of which the manu-
facturer was aware) come to light in the post-approval period. 
But between these extreme positions lies a middle-course approach, 
whereby courts would be able to look specifically at the risk-risk determi-
nation by the Agency—not just at the time of approval, but during the post-
approval period as well.  Most of these cases deal with situations where 
 
 13 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
 14 No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006). 
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new risks allegedly came to light in the post-approval process.  The manu-
facturer then has an opportunity to go back to the FDA. 
In Levine, the manufacturer went back to the FDA (during the post-
approval period) to try to strengthen a warning for a different variety of the 
drug  and  was  told  to  “[r]etain  verbiage  in  current  label.”15  The court none-
theless held—erroneously, in my view—that a state law failure to warn 
claim   was   not   impliedly   preempted   by   the   FDA’s   regulatory   action   pur-
suant to the FDCA.  
Perry v. Novartis16 embodies the middle-course approach that I am 
advocating here.  The federal district court rejected the two extreme posi-
tions:  at  one  pole,  that  the  FDA’s  preemption  preamble  should  be  rejected  
altogether, and at the other pole, that the preamble should be accorded 
mandatory Chevron deference.      Instead,   the  court  decided   that   the  FDA’s  
views embodied in the preamble should receive Skidmore,   or   “power   to  
persuade,”  deference.17  I think that the Perry court staked out the correct 
approach. 
Moreover, this middle-course position comports with the U.S. Su-
preme  Court’s  jurisprudence.    I  unearthed  an  interesting  positive empirical 
finding when doing a study of products liability preemption.  If you look at 
the  U.S.  Supreme  Court’s   product   liability   preemption   cases,  which   span  
from Cipollone18 to Bates,19 in every case (save Bates),  the  Court’s  ultimate  
decision, whether pro-preemption or anti-preemption, aligns with the posi-
tion urged by the relevant agency.  Thus, the FDA had argued in favor of 
preemption in Buckman,20 and the Court went that way; it argued against 
preemption in Medtronic,21 and the Court went that way.  NHTSA argued 
in favor of preemption in Geier22 and against preemption in Freightliner,23 
and   the   Court   followed   suit.      The   Court’s   anti-preemption holding in 
Sprietsma24 likewise  follows  the  agency’s  position.    The  Coast  Guard,  hav-
ing done a risk-risk analysis, came to the conclusion that no uniform pro-
peller guard design was suitable, given the variety of recreational boats and 
motors in existence; and thus, a state law design defect claim in no way in-
terfered with any federal policy reflected in its decision not to regulate. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  been  very  cryptic.    It  has  never  said,  “We  are  
applying Chevron (or Skidmore) deference   here.”     Most   often   in   dissent,  
Justices  try  to  force  the  issue  by  saying,  “Look,  the  Justices  in  the  majority  
 
 15 Id. at ¶21. 
 16 Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D.Pa. 2006). 
 17 Id. at 683. 
 18 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 19 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
 20 Buckman  Co.  v.  Plaintiffs’  Legal  Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
 21 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 22 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 23 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995). 
 24 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
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are giving deference  by  saying   things   like   ‘We  give   significant  weight   to  
the  Agency’s  determination,’  but  they  never  come  out  and  say  they  are  ac-
cording Chevron deference.”    If  you  look  carefully  at  what  the  majorities  in  
those cases do, though, I think they apply something that looks like Skid-
more deference, and in general provide a model for courts to follow. 
One last observation: if you look at the dozen or so cases that post-
date  the  issuance  of  the  FDA’s  preemption  preamble,  some  have  been  de-
cided by federal courts, some by state courts.  The state courts have, over 
the past quarter century, consistently rebuffed the regulatory compliance 
defense to state common law tort actions; it is hardly surprising, then, to 
find that state courts, on the whole, seem predisposed to resist the idea of 
federal preemption of state law, which after all, is essentially an even more 
forceful immunity-conferring mechanism.  The federal courts seem more 
likely to listen to what the FDA says, and the FDA is much more likely to 
intervene in federal cases, either on its own or when the Court asks for its 
views.25  That will be a very interesting dynamic to observe over time. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN:  Our final panelist will be Professor Mer-
rill. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: Thank you very much.  I notice that the 
room is a little crowded in the back, so in the effort to clear things out, let 
me  announce  in  advance  that  I’m  going  to  be  talking  about  administrative  
law doctrine for the next eight minutes.  In case you want leave quickly, 
now is your chance to do that. 
I’m  going  to  approach  this  from  the  perspective  of  administrative  law  
rather than tort law or ordinary preemption law.  I think when you approach 
it from a perspective of administrative law, you discover that the range of 
disagreement here is actually quite narrow; that a number of propositions 
which you might think would be contestable in fact have been resolved, 
more or less, by express holdings of the Supreme Court or by settled prop-
ositions (or at least what I regard as several propositions, of administrative 
law).  So, let me mention three things that I, at least, regard as settled prop-
ositions, which have the effect, I think, of compressing the area of disa-
greement down to a fairly small point. 
First,   it’s   well   established   that   agency   legislative regulations have 
preemptive effects.  If an agency has been delegated power to act with the 
force of law, to issue legislative regulations, where those legislative regula-
tions are deemed inconsistent with state law—by the court, at least—
 
 25 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceut-
ical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 BROOKLYN J.L. & POL’Y 1013 (2007). 
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there’s no question that the federal regulation trumps or preempts state law.  
This was held back in 1961 in United States v. Shimer26 and reaffirmed in 
the de la Cuesta27 case in 1982.  The issue is off the table. 
Second, if Congress expressly delegates authority to an agency to is-
sue preemptive regulations—not just legislative regulations, but regulations 
that  say,  “We  deem  state  law  in  Area  X  to  be  preempted”—that is permiss-
ible as well.  There are a number of examples in federal law where Con-
gress has given express preemptive authority to agencies, whose exercise of 
that  authority  has  been  upheld  by  courts.    The  Supreme  Court’s  authority  at  
this point is a little sketchier.  If I had my way, the Court would insist a bit 
more on the need for express delegated authority to preempt, rather than 
finding   it   in   some  kind  of   clearly   implied   fashion.     There’s   a   case   called  
New York v. FCC28 from 1988, in which the Supreme Court found express 
authority to issue preemptive regulations based on congressional ratifica-
tion of prior practice by the agency, which I think is pushing it a little far.  
But the basic proposition that Congress can expressly delegate preemptive 
authority to an agency, I think, is off the table as well. 
Thirdly,  an  agency’s  statement  of  its  opinion  about the preemptive ef-
fect of either the federal statutory scheme or a combination of the federal 
statutes and federal regulations is not entitled to Chevron deference.  The 
reason for this follows from recently established principles about when 
Chevron does and does not apply.  The infamous Mead case that Ron tried 
to make me promise not to mention, holds—, well, who knows exactly 
what it holds?—I think it holds that agencies are entitled to Chevron defe-
rence only if they act with the force of law; meaning that   they’re   issuing  
something like a legislative regulation which is within their delegated ju-
risdiction.  If they issue an interpretation of rule or some kind of opinion 
letter,  that’s  not  entitled  to  Chevron deference. 
Now, with respect to these preambles, the issue is a little bit trickier.  I 
take it that a statement in a preamble about the preemptive effect of a fed-
eral regulation being adopted pursuant to whatever perambulatory state-
ment does not itself have the force of law.  Administrative lawyers distin-
guish   all   the   time   between   what’s   called   the   Statement   of   Basis   and  
Purpose required by Section 553 of the APA and the regulation itself.  The 
regulation itself is a thing that goes into the Code of Federal Regulations.  
That’s  what  has  the  force  of  law.  The statement in the preamble is the ex-
planation for the regulation.  It does not of its own effect have the force of 
law. 
If an agency has to interpret federal statutory authority in order to 
reach a particular legislative regulation, and the explanation for its statutory 
 
 26 U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961). 
 27 Fidelity  Federal  Sav.  &  Loan  Ass’n  v.  de  la  Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
 28 City of New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57 (1988). 
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authority is in the preamble, it is entitled to Chevron deference, because the 
explanation is the condition precedent for the regulation itself.  But if you 
have something like a regulation dealing with drug labeling and the FDA 
says in  the  preamble,  “By  the  way,  it’s  our  opinion  that  any  state  court  ac-
tion   inconsistent   with   this   labeling   would   be   preempted,”   that’s   just   a  
statement  of  agency  opinion;;   it’s  not  a  necessary  condition  of  finding  au-
thority on the part of the agency to issue that regulation.  It would not be 
entitled to Chevron deference. 
So, I think those propositions are pretty much settled. 
What is not settled is the issue presented by the Watters case, which is 
going to be argued on November 29.  The issue is: What happens if an 
agency that has legislative rulemaking authority—but has not been given 
express authority to issue preemptive regulations—uses its general rule-
making authority to issue what purports to be a legislative regulation, 
which regulation then states the agency’s  determination  that  state  law  in  a  
particular area is preempted?  Is that sort of legislative regulation pursuant 
to a general delegation of authority rather than to an authority to preempt 
also entitled to Chevron deference, or to some lesser degree of deference, 
presumably Skidmore? 
In answering this question, I think we have to revert to more general 
principles and not simple case law and settled principles of administrative 
law.  Several propositions are relevant here in sorting things out.  First of 
all,  I  do  not  agree  with  Ron’s  statement  that  determinations  of  preemption  
are simply a species of statutory interpretation. 
In preemption cases, there are three determinations to be made, not 
just one.  The first determination is that somebody, be it a court or an agen-
cy,  has  to  decide  what  the  federal  law  means  or  requires.    That’s  an  exer-
cise of straightforward interpretation.  Then, the decision-maker, be it a 
court  or  agency,  has  to  decide  what  the  state  law  means  or  requires.    That’s  
another exercise in interpretation.  The third step is critically different; that 
is, the decision-maker has to decide how much tension there is between the 
federal and the state law, if any; and, given the degree of tension, whether 
it’s  necessary  to  displace  or  nullify state law in order to effectuate the gen-
eral purposes of the federal statutory regime. 
Now,  in  some  instances,   that  third  step  is  not  necessary.     You’ve  got  
an express preemption clause which is squarely on point; that would not be 
a contested case.  In  all  other  cases,  if  there’s  a  dispute  about  the  scope  of  
an express preemption clause, something about obstacle or frustration of 
purpose preemption or field preemption—even, in most cases, of conflict 
preemption  where  there’s  not  a  square  X  or  Y  type  of conflict—somebody 
has to decide whether a displacement of state law is necessary. 
So, the question is really one of institutional choice, as several of the 
other speakers mentioned.  Who is going to make this determination of dis-
placement?  I think an argument can be made that the agencies ought to be 
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given significant say-so in this exercise.  The agencies, after all, have great 
expertise about the nature of the statutory scheme.  They probably have a 
unique understanding about how state law is or is not going to interfere 
with the way the federal statutory scheme is carried out.  But let me give 
you some quick reasons why I think strong Chevron deference probably is 
not  the  way  to  go  in  making  this  displacement  determination.    I’ll  just  men-
tion these quickly. 
First of all, and Cathy mentioned this briefly, preemption is an issue 
that comes up in state court almost as often as it comes up in federal court.  
I have trouble imagining exactly how the U.S. Supreme Court is going to 
enforce a duty upon state courts to give Chevron deference to federal ad-
ministrative agencies on the question of preemption.  The Supreme Court 
just does not have the institutional capacity, I think, to change state court 
behavior in that radical direction.  Something like a Skidmore doctrine, 
which allows agencies to submit their views in various ways and instructs 
courts to give them effect insofar as they are persuasive, would, I think, be 
something more reasonably workable in the state court system. 
Secondly, I think there are systemic considerations here.  Most of our 
panelists are interested in explaining how Madison was really in favor of a 
powerful federal government, but there are systemic interests here in terms 
of maintaining a balance between the federal government and the states; 
that is, not having the federal regulatory juggernaut completely take over 
our  system.    I’m  concerned  that  if  each  federal  agency  which  has  a  little  in-
dividual regulatory slice of the world is given Chevron deference for its de-
terminations,   we’re   going to see a lot more displacement of state law.  
There will be a tendency for each agency individual to push the limits of 
federal law in isolation.  We need some kind of judicial counterweight to 
that.  I think the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court in particular, which 
has a broad-brush picture about the need for state and federal balance in the 
system, is a better institution to maintain that balance than are individual 
agencies. 
Lastly,  and  I’ll  close  with  this  point,  the  question  of  whether  agencies 
can preempt or be given strong Chevron deference for preempting state law 
is  another  one  of   these   issues   that   implicate   the  scope  of  an  agency’s  au-
thority.  All sorts of scope issues come up about whether agencies can re-
gulate with the force of law or not.  But there are reasons to be concerned 
about giving that issue to states to decide under a strong deference doctrine 
like Chevron.  Agencies would have a tendency to view state regulators as 
rivals, to see state courts as rivals, and try to expand their authority.  We 
need federal courts to discipline the boundaries of agency action.  Skidmore 
is better suited to doing that than Chevron. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Well, I want to thank the panelists for lay-
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ing out all of the considerations very, very effectively.  Before we take 
questions from the floor, I thought I would offer the opportunity for each of 
the panelists to comment on anything any of the others have said.  And 
since  Mr.  Troy  went  first,  he’ll  have  the  first  crack. 
 
HON. MR. TROY: Thank you.  I think Tom expected me to start 
throwing things at them on the question of Chevron versus Skidmore defe-
rence.  I think they are very strong arguments, which I understand, for ac-
cording Skidmore deference, but I want to make couple of points.  First of 
all, the preamble—there’s  preemption  whether  or  not  the  Agency  came  out  
with the preamble, and the Agency was asserting that there was preemption 
before that.  The key point is, what are the decisions that the agency is 
making, and what kind of a position  does  it  put  the  company  in?    So  that’s  
point one. 
Point two: The FDA was very clear that you do need to come post-
approval and adhere to the very stringent regulations which require you to 
notify the Agency of additional decisions, of additional information, and a 
company’s  obligations  do  not  end  once  the  product  is  approved.    An  FDA  
scrutiny of a product does not end once the product is approved.  This is a 
misconception. Companies are required to collect adverse event data and to 
feed it back to the Agency under very stringent time frames.  The Agency 
continues to monitor that data. 
But this Levine case, which I am not involved with, let me confess—
although I do generally represent, at this point, many clients in connection 
with these issues—but in the Levine case, I want to spend a moment on it to 
show what an existential threat it is to FDA, what an untenable position it 
puts the company in, and how bad it is for the public health.  In this Levine 
case, basically FDA look at the data.  The company came and said we want 
to   put   this   additional   warning.      And   FDA   said   we   don’t   think   it’s   war-
ranted.  We think the current route of administration, notwithstanding that 
it has some very serious side effects—in this case, the women, tragically, 
who is very popular local musician, lost her arm—but we believe this is the 
proper route of administration, looking at all of the data. 
And so, the company actually not only gave in all the relevant data, 
but the company actually proposed an additional warning.  FDA wrote 
back   formally,   “retain   current  verbiage”.      If  a   state   court  can  come  along  
and say who cares what the FDA says, Company, you needed to do some-
thing  else,  what  does  that  say,  A,  about  the  FDA’s  ability  to  decide  what  is  
and is not on a drug label; B, what is the company supposed to do? 
I’m  not   saying   that   any   time   a   company   changes   its  warning   before  
FDA  has  officially  blessed  it,  there’s  misbranding.    But  there  are  circums-
tances  where  FDA  has  said,  you  know  what,  you  can’t  just  slap  any  warn-
ing that you want for sort of just defensive labeling purposes.  The problem 
with that, and this gets into the public health point, is the labels have be-
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come—let’s  be  clear.    When  we’re  talking  about  FDA  labeling,  we’re  talk-
ing about those little things that are folded that are in, you know, tiny, tiny, 
tiny font that fill pages and pages and pages and pages that basically no-
body can read—which we all read slavishly before we take each pill—
those are actually intended for the physician, but even the physicians, they 
have become so prolix that FDA found that they were being written too 
much as defensive legal documents rather than as risk communication doc-
uments to doctors.  And so the context in which FDA put out this preemp-
tion statement was a context in which it was overhauling that labeling, that 
physician  label,  and  it  was  saying  we’re  going  to  try  to  make  this  simpler.    
And what happened in the sort of run-up  to  it  was  the  company  said  that’s  a  
great idea.  Less is more.  You know, doctors and health care practitioners 
will be able to understand more if the thing is simpler.  But if you make us 
take  out  warnings,  we’re   going   to   get   killed   in  product   liability   litigation  
and failure to warn litigation. 
So   the   FDA   said,   well,   we   think   it’s   a   better   thing   for   the   public  
health, that better decisions will be made, if you have, for example, the 
summary  provision  that  they  called  highlights,  and  we’re  going  to  say  that  
if we tell you that you have to take something out or exclude something 
from highlights so that the public health goal can be achieved of a clear, 
simple  message  to  doctors.    If  we’re  telling  you  to  do  that,  you  shouldn’t  be  
held liable by state courts for failure to warn.  And that was the context in 
which FDA ultimately issued this. 
Now, whether it gets strong Chevron deference or whether he gets 
Skidmore deference,  I  think  it’s  sufficiently  persuasive  that  it  doesn’t  really  
need strong Chevron deference to prevail.  Obviously, some state courts 
have disagreed, and this is an issue that is going to be—there’s  going to be 
further judicial resolution of it.  But the public health of the matter is such 
that we really do have and need to have one agency that determines what 
doctors are and should be told about a product, as long as that agency is be-
ing given the relevant information as quickly as possible, and as appropri-
ate. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Any rejoinder from the Academy? 
 
PROFESSOR SHARKEY: Two quick points.  The first one is, lis-
tening to Mr. Troy, it seems like he might adopt my middle-course ap-
proach, which of course would get me very excited. 
 
HON. MR. TROY: I  didn’t  realize  I  had  that  power. 
 
PROFESSOR SHARKEY: Levine is a case that we would both see 
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as   being  wrongly   decided   case.      There’s   strong   evidence   that,   in   that   in-
stance, the FDA actually rejected increasing the strength of the label.  But 
would you adopt more broadly my middle course position? 
Perry v. Novartis,29 which you have not talked about, is a case in 
which the court finds no preemption and looks to the fact that the FDA 
didn’t  make  a  specific  determination regarding the relevant risk one way or 
the other.  A more extreme position—either  the  FDA’s  misbranding  argu-
ment or Chevron deference to the pro-preemption position embodied in the 
preamble—would have led the court to the opposite result.  In fact, the 
court held that there was no preemption specifically because the FDA was 
looking  at  a  bunch  of  inconclusive  evidence  and  wasn’t  able  to  make  a  de-
finitive determination to regulate or not.  Perry is thus a less clear-cut case 
than Levine, given the scientific uncertainty surrounding the risk and the 
FDA’s  apprehension  at  weighing  in  prematurely. 
The contested ground is going to be in these contexts, where the rele-
vant  agency  doesn’t  regulate,  and  you  need  to  ask  “Why  not?”    In  Spriets-
ma,30 for example,  the  Coast  Guard  didn’t  pass  a  uniform  federal  regulatory  
standard for boat safety, and it came up with some reasons like, given that 
the boats are designed in various particular ways to suit local conditions, it 
was not possible to come up with one uniform standard.  What the Coast 
Guard, in not regulating, did not say that it wanted to leave the determina-
tion to the market or that it specifically wanted to displace state law.  In 
such contestable cases where the FDA has not made a specific determina-
tion, I wonder whether Mr. Troy would sign on to my middle ground posi-
tion. 
The  second  quick  point  I’d  like   to  make  focuses  on  the  disclosure  of  
information to the FDA.  I agree with what Mr. Troy said with respect to 
the FDA attempts to tell the drug manufacturer that they have all sorts of 
obligations to come back with new information.  A new report just came 
out studying the FDA, which shows how the FDA can enforce the promises 
that they ask of drug manufacturers.  In a similar vein, I think our system 
should think about crafting rules to be information-forcing. My middle-
course approach places a burden on the manufacturers to come back to the 
FDA with evidence of newly discovered risks during the post-approval pe-
riod. Fraud perpetrated on the FDA is another matter.31  The  FDA’s  pream-
ble  contains  a  “fraud  caveat,”  suggesting  that  FDA-approval based preemp-
tion   is   conditional   upon   the   manufacturer’s   not   having   withheld  
information from the FDA.  But how will this disclosure of information be 
policed?  The problem is that the Supreme Court has said, in Buckman, that 
fraud on the FDA claims are preempted.  Unless the FDA polices not only 
 
 29 Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp, 456 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D.Pa. 2006). 
 30 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
 31 See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U.L. REV. _ 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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fraud but incomplete information disclosure as well, a kind of regulatory 
void is created. 
 
HON. MR. TROY: A company is obligated to reveal to the Agency 
every  adverse  event  it  finds  out  about,  and  that  is  enforceable.    If  you  don’t  
do so, there are, can be, and have been—for example, Guidant—criminal 
penalties associated with that.  The thing that people said that FDA cannot 
enforce is commitments post-marketing to do certain clinical trials, okay?  
But companies have an ongoing legal obligation to monitor and report to 
the Agency every adverse drug experience that they find out about, and 
they have obligations to do what they can to try and find out that informa-
tion.      It’s   just   specific   studies   that   the   Agency   currently   cannot   compel  
people to do post approval. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Dean Cass. 
 
DEAN CASS:  Thank   you.  Some  of   you  may  have   noticed   it’s   very  
difficult to open the doors in the  back.    That’s  for  a  reason.  We  knew  we’d  
be talking about the difference between Skidmore and Chevron deference. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: It  came  to  that,  didn’t  it? 
 
DEAN CASS: After 30 years of law teaching I recognize that glazed 
expression, and I want to offer a word of explanation before I disagree with 
my colleagues.  There are some concepts that are so complicated that only 
administrative law professors could embrace them. 
For those of you who are not familiar with the jargon, Chevron defe-
rence is what  I  give  to  my  wife.    I  know  we’re  going  to  wind  up  doing  what  
she  says,  so  we  start  out  with  the  presumption  that  that’s  what  we’re  going  
to do. 
Skidmore deference is what she gives to me. 
 
HON. MR. TROY: If you get Skidmore deference, you are a lucky 
man. 
 
DEAN CASS: There are many reasons I am a lucky man. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: Whatever happened to no deference, 
Ron? 
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DEAN CASS: The nice thing about Skidmore deference if it means 
that  we  do  what  I  say  when  she’s  persuaded  that  she  wants  to  do  it  anyway.    
And   that’s  why   the  notion  of  Skidmore deference is a wonderful concept 
for courts, which means that they do what the agency says when they 
would’ve  done  it  without  the  agency  doing  it  anyway. 
I think that we are better off having very simple concepts here.  When 
Tom  says  that  the  Supreme  Court  can’t  police  all  the  state  courts  and  can’t  
make sure they give Chevron deference,  that  doesn’t  strike  me  as  a  reason  
for telling them to give agencies no difference in all, which is essentially 
what the alternative is that Tom has moved to.  I think that we have a world 
in which either we can give deference of some undefined magnitude or re-
ally not give deference at all.  Courts talk about Skidmore deference when 
they  aren’t  really  deferring  to  the  agency. 
I think that we also are in a world where, when agency is making deci-
sions, it is making decisions trying to do the sort of risk-risk analysis 
you’re   talking   about.   I   think   agencies,   as   bad   as   there   are   times   at   doing  
this, are far better suited to that than courts are.  I have the utmost respect 
for judges, but I know many of them.  And the last thing you want to see is 
having judges make this sort of complex risk-risk  analysis.    It’s  like  I  know  
they’re  going  Dancing with the Stars now—watching the ordinary football 
player dance is not a pretty thing. 
 
JUDGE   O’SCANNLAIN: Before calling on Professor Merrill, I 
would like to invite any of those among you who would like to ask ques-
tions to come up to the microphone, and we will recognize you in the order 
in which you appear. 
Professor Merrill. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: Well,  I  don’t  think  Skidmore deference is 
no  deference  at  all.  I  think  that’s  much  too  cynical  a  view  both  about  courts  
and about agencies. 
Bill Eskridge has a study that he is finishing up now in which he looks 
at every Supreme Court decision involving a federal agency going back to 
1950 or something like that.32  And  it’s  an  interesting  study.    He  shows  that  
federal agencies do very well; they win about 70 to 75 percent of the time.  
And  there  doesn’t  seem  to  be much of a correlation between the Chevron, 
Skidmore, or cases where there is no express tentative review at all.  So to 
that extent, I guess that does tend to reinforce the idea that these standards 
 
 32 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The  Supreme  Court’s  Deference  Continuum,  An  Em-
prirical Analysis (Chevron to Hamdan), __ GEORGETOWN L.J. __ (forthcoming 2008). 
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of  review  don’t  really  matter  that  much. 
But  that’s  a  study about the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court I 
think maybe a little different from the lower courts, where I have a feeling 
that Chevron deference really does make a difference.  When federal courts 
think that Chevron applies, they shift into a different mode of thinking 
about agency decisions than they might otherwise think about them. 
The   other   interesting   observation   that’s   come   out   recently,   is   Nina  
Mendelson has a study about this issue in the Michigan Law Review,33 and 
she looked at all of the agency decisions that were rendered under the ex-
ecutive order requiring federalism impact statements.  She reports, quite 
strikingly, that when agencies do talk about preemption, the analysis is not 
very illuminating.  The usually just try to follow judicial preemption doc-
trine and predict how a court would decide the preemption issue, rather 
than actually discussing underlying substantive issues about how much 
state law is going to interfere with federal law and how important it is to 
have a uniform federal scheme in a particular area. 
One of my thoughts about the desirability of Skidmore is that Skid-
more really would force the agencies to try to persuade courts about wheth-
er preemption is acceptable or not acceptable, and so it might, in a helpful 
sort of way, cause them to give more thoughtful consideration to the under-
lying  policy  variables,  which  is  after  all  what  we’re  really  looking  to  them  
for   illumination   about.   And   if   they   just   announce   that   they   think   it’s  
preempted or not preempted and they are entitled to Chevron deference for 
that,  we’re  really  not  going  to  get  some  of  the  benefits  from  agency  deci-
sion making that we could potentially get under a different standard of re-
view. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Thank you very much. 
Now, the floor is open for questions. Please give us your name and 
your hometown. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Thank you, sir. My name is Brad 
Tupe.  I’m  from  Pittsburgh,  Pennsylvania.   In  any  of  these  product   liability  
trials, in the courtroom you have the plaintiff telling the story of the in-
jury—the adverse reaction, the chemical exposure or whatever the case 
may be—you have an expert witness that testifies that if only the manufac-
turer had added a certain line to the warning, this never would have oc-
curred, which is usually fallacious. And then you have a jury that hears 
evidence over the course of a few days, maybe a day, maybe a week, may-
be longer, deliberates an hour or two; a jury made up of people, some of 
 
 33 Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
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whom  have  college  educations  and  some  of  whom  don’t,  who  then  deter-
mine, in the case  we’re  discussing,  that  the  plaintiff  should  receive  a  mul-
timillion dollar award. 
Contrast that with the negotiation, the adversarial negotiation that oc-
curs between a manufacturer and either your agency, Mr. Troy, or the EPA 
in the case of a FIFRA pesticide, that takes years, millions of dollars, truck-
loads  of  documents,  and  you’re  going  to  have  a  situation  where  a  jury  hear-
ing evidence for just a couple of days can substitute a judgment for this ad-
versarial  agency  process.  It  doesn’t  make  any  sense. 
What’s   really   going   on,   I   submit,   and   I’d   be   interested   in   your   re-
sponse, is that the courts are saying that the manufacturers are insurers, and 
that  every  injury  must  have  a  remedy,  and  that’s  never  been  our  law. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: I   think   there’s   a   question in there some-
where.  Responses? 
 
HON. MR. TROY: Well,  you  make  a  very  good  point.  I’m  not  sure  
that everybody in the industry would necessarily characterize their relation-
ship with FDA as adversarial.  There is, you know, a lot of cooperation and 
collaboration because, frankly, companies have an interest in an appropri-
ate label that does adequately address the risks of the product, in part be-
cause it protects them in product liability and partly because they want to—
you know, they have reputational interests in a lot of contexts, especially 
vis-à-vis position physicians.  And it will not do if, you know, they are un-
derestimating or understating what the risks are.  And then, physicians can 
end up with, you know, bad outcomes and themselves getting sued in med-
ical   malpractice.      And   let’s—you   know,   even   though   we’re   all   lawyers,  
let’s  be  clear  that  it’s  not  the  law  that  motivates  everybody  in  the  healthcare  
system.  There are actually some people who want to make people better 
and want to do the right thing. 
But  you’re  right.    You’re  right,  and  one  of  the  ideas  that  people  have  
floated in the drug contexts is, should there be some kind of better way?  
Should there be some kind of alternative compensation system, since we 
know to a moral certainty when a product is approved that there are going 
to  be  a  certain  number  of  people  who  are  going  to  be  harmed  by  it?    Let’s  
take statins, those cholesterol-lowering drugs which are literally miracles of 
modern technology, and the most important thing that any of you can do is 
go and check your cholesterol and probably—this is what Bob Temple, the 
dean of the drug approval process, always says—the most popular public 
health development in the last 15 years has been development of statins. 
We know there are going to be a certain number of people who get a 
terrible condition called rhabdomyolysis.  Is it worth it societally for those 
50 people who are going to get rhabdomyolysis to have the incredibly posi-
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tive public health benefits associated with statins?  Of course it is.  Should 
something  be  done  for  those  50  people?    You  know,  there’s  a  pretty  good  
case that there should be.  Should it be handled through our tort system, 
which is essentially a lottery?  I would argue the answer to that is not. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Dean Cass. 
 
DEAN CASS: Well  actually,  having  spent  15  years  as  a  dean,  I’m  at  
my best turning the mic on and off for my colleague here. 
I  think  it’s  very  important  to  recognize  that  there  will  be  cases  when  it  
is appropriate to have the issue handled through the tort system.  My disa-
greement, I think, with Tom and Catherine is over where the presumption 
should lie on who should make that decision.  And I think that while the 
agencies do have incentives to overreach, the complex decision, the amount 
of difficulty in trying to figure out what should be opened up to other me-
chanisms and what should not, is so difficult, and it is so likely to be gotten 
wrong because the competence of the decision maker in a state court litiga-
tion is so much less sophisticated at making this decision, so much less 
geared to making this decision, even if they had every incentive to do that, 
I think that the risk of doing it that way is greater.  So my presumption 
would  lie  with  the  ability  of  the  agency  to  say  don’t  do  that. 
 
PROFESSOR SHARKEY: It is important to frame the debate as the 
balance and interplay between state common law tort and regulation. 
I want to sound two notes of caution for people who are in favor of 
broad preemption of state tort law.  First, the argument in favor of preemp-
tion can become overdetermined.  Take, for example, the position of Ri-
chard Epstein, a colleague at University of Chicago.  Richard believes that 
product liability cases should be handled in contract, not tort law.  Having 
failed to convince the academic community or the prevailing court systems 
of that view, he then moved to the view that there should be a very strong 
regulatory compliance defense.  Regulatory compliance as an absolute de-
fense was an abject failure in terms of taking hold across state jurisdictions.  
It turns out there are very few state outliers.  Michigan is the only state that 
has  a  regulatory  compliance  statutory  defense  that’s  almost  airtight.    Hav-
ing failed there, Epstein moves to a position in favor of preemption across 
the board here.  But even he will say this is therefore an overdetermined 
view.      It   doesn’t   actually   rest   on   the  nuances  of  Supreme  Court   jurispru-
dence on preemption principles.  To my mind, the intersection between 
preemption principles and the tort law regulatory balance are actually im-
portant issues to think about. 
The second note of caution is to recognize that all federal agencies 
should not be treated as equals.  It is often said that the United States, as 
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compared to Europe or other countries, regulates products mostly ex post 
via litigation.  Of all the federal agencies, the FDA engages in the most 
stringent ex ante regulation.  The stringency of ex ante regulation might di-
rectly affect our views of agency preemption.  Would we, for example, 
want to defer to agency preemption when the relevant agency is the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission which regulates without undertaking the 
kind of comprehensive review conducted by the FDA?  Would our views 
on preemption change depending upon the particular federal scheme, and 
corresponding statutory authorization for the relevant agency?  For these 
reasons,  I   think  it’s   important  not  to  let  a  view  that  juries  can’t  decide  is-
sues swamp what actually could lead to a principled argument for preemp-
tion in a particular context. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Next question from the floor. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Richard Samp from Arlington, Vir-
ginia.  Very often the Supreme Court, in its preemption cases, says, well, 
we start with a strong presumption against preemption because, after all, 
the Congress is known to be so respectful of the use of states that they 
would never want to unknowingly preempt some sort of state law.  And 
while   sometimes   I   think   that’s   just   to  make  way  argument   that’s  put   into  
the cases, I think at least Justice Ginsburg believes that because she were 
repeatedly  say,  well,  even  when  there’s  evidence  that  Congress  intended  to  
preempt affirmative state regulation, I think it would be just so outlandish 
that they would ever want to preempt a common law tort suit.  But I’m  just  
never going to agree that there is such preemption, unless Congress says 
that explicitly. 
Certainly, as you can tell from the gist of my question, I think this 
whole idea that Congress really starts with this presumption against 
preemption just has no empirical basis.  And it seems to me that if a court 
looks  very  carefully  at  all  the  evidence  and  it  says,  well,  it’s  a  close  ques-
tion, but we think that at the end of the day the evidence is slightly in favor 
of preemption, it would make no sense to say, but nonetheless because 
there’s   a   presumption,   we’re   going   to   shift   the   balance   and   go   against  
preemption. 
I’m  wondering   if   there   is   anybody  on   this  panel  who  would   support  
the idea that there also be a presumption against preemption? 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Professor Merrill. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: Not me, but— 
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JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: But  you  have  the  floor.  It’s  okay. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: I think the problem with the presumption 
against  preemption   is   it’s   just   too  overly  broad.      I  mean,  you  could  either  
have a presumption in favor of the states in every case or a presumption in 
favor of the federal government in every case.  Either one of those rules 
would be overly broad. 
The presumption against preemption fails to account for the fact that 
we have a federal government of enumerated powers. And so, in some 
areas, the regulation of interstate commerce, for example, why would you 
have  a  presumption  against  preemption?    Because  that’s  presumptively  an  
area where the federal government has exclusive, or at least plenary, au-
thority to regulate, and the dormant Commerce Clause stands as testament 
to the fact that there is in fact a presumption in favor of federal regulation 
in that area. 
The more interesting aspect of your question I think is this question 
about to what extent the states are represented in Congress.  This is an ar-
gument that Herbert Wechsler pioneered back in the 1950s, and it contin-
ues to have adherents, and it is offered as a justification for federal courts 
not overriding state prerogatives in different areas. 
One  interesting  thing  I’m  sort  of  struggling  with  right  now  is  to  what  
extent does that sort of perspective apply to administrative agencies to ei-
ther an equal, lesser, or greater extent than to Congress itself?  Again, I 
think the answer is probably   it  all  depends  on  what  agency  you’re  talking  
about.     We  have  a   lot  of  administrative  agencies,  and  EPA  is  the  one  I’m  
most familiar with, where most of the regulating under the federal statutes 
is done by state administrators, and so federal EPA is constantly interacting 
with state regulators on a daily basis and is very familiar with state pros-
pective on problems.  In that sort of context, you might say that the agency 
really  is  a  very  effective  representative  of  state  interests  because  they’re  in-
timately familiar with the state perspective. 
But other agencies, and here I would hazard to cite the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency as a potential example, are quite the opposite.  
In the banking world, you have federally chartered banks and state char-
tered banks.  The OCC is in charge of federally chartered banks and states 
are   in   charge  of   state   chartered  banks,  and   there’s  not  a   lot  of   interaction  
between those two groups.  So when the OCC seeks to preempt state regu-
lation of state chartered operating  subsidiaries  of  federal  banks,  they’re  en-
trenching on the turf of the state regulators in a big-time way, and they 
don’t   really   have   a   lot   of   information   as   to   what   the   impacts   of   that   are  
going to be.  So in that context, Congress may in fact be a better forum for 
sorting out state versus federal interests than the agency is. 
So  it’s  a  very  competent  question  and  one  reason  I  think  maybe  Herb  
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Wechsler’s  analysis   is  not   the  way   to  go   in   trying   to  sort  out   these   issues  
case by case. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Before taking a comment from Professor 
Sharkey, Professor Merrill, would you like to hazard a guess on what the 
Supreme Court will do in the OCC bank case?  This is Waters. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRILL: This is my private view and not the view 
of any client that I represent in this case.  My guess is that the Court is 
going  to  look  at  this  and  they’re  going  to  say,  is  there  any  way  we  can  de-
cide   this  without   reaching   this   issue?      I   think   they’ll   figure  out   a  way  of  
doing that.  So this big debate, which has been briefed in the amicus briefs 
between Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and no deference on this 
little issue, my guess is will not be resolved by Waters.      But   I’ve   been  
wrong before. 
 
JUDGE  O’SCANNLAIN: Professor Sharkey. 
 
PROFESSOR SHARKEY: I just wanted to make a point about the 
presumption against preemption.  In these products liability Supreme Court 
cases,   it’s   actually   interesting   to   trace   where   the   presumption   does   and  
where it does not rear its head.  So in Geier,  of  course,  there’s  not  a  men-
tion in the majority opinion about this alleged presumption against preemp-
tion, and the Court in that instance preempts.  In the Bates case, the pre-
sumption comes back in full force.  So I think that if anything—at least in 
these products cases—the Court has applied the presumption against 
preemption is a haphazard manner. 
(Panel concluded.) 
